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Abstract
This article focuses on ‘therefore’ constructions such as ‘The switch is on,
and therefore the lights are on’. We submit that the contribution of ‘there-
fore’ is to express a dependence as part of the core content of these con-
structions, rather than being conveyed by conventional implicature (Grice
1975, Potts 2005, Neta 2013) or a triggered presupposition (Pavese 2017,
forthcoming, Stokke 2017). We argue that the standard objections to this
view can be answered by relying on the general projection hypothesis de-
fended by Roberts et al. (2009) and Simons et al. (2010), leaving our view
on solid ground.




It is uncontroversial that the use of ‘therefore’ in sentences like (1) conveys that
a certain dependence holds.
(1) The switch in the hall is on, and therefore the lights in the
office are on.1
By uttering (1), the speaker can convey that the lights in the office are on due
to the switch in the hall being on. Alternatively, the speaker can convey that
her believing that the lights in the office are on is due to her believing that
the switch in the hall is on (cf. Jenkins 2008, p. 73; see also Neta 2013). Either
way, some dependence is conveyed by (1) and this observation holds for simple
‘therefore’ constructions generally.
The controversial question is how the dependence is conveyed. Some think
this information is carried by conventional implicature (e.g. Grice, 1975; Potts,
2005, 2007; Neta, 2013). Others think this dependence is a triggered presup-
position (e.g. Pavese, 2017; Stokke, 2017). In this article, we defend a view
according to which the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ constructions is
part of what we will call the ‘core content’ of such constructions. Varieties of
this view are suggested by Bach (1999, p. 330), Neale (1999, p. 57), and Horn
(2013, p. 191). However, recent work on ‘therefore’ tends to set such views aside
without much discussion. For example, in a recent article, Pavese (forthcom-
ing) discusses views according to which the dependence is either presupposed
or conventionally implicated in-depth (p. 12–19), while summarily dismissing
the view we defend here (p. 11–12). We will argue that this view in fact fits
with the data levied against it.
First, we characterise what we will call ‘core content’ by distinguishing it
from implicatures and presupposition triggers. Then we evaluate the principal
objections against treating the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ construc-
tions as part of the core content of these constructions. We argue that these
objections can be met and conclude that, contrary to the recent contentions in
the literature, the possibility of treating this dependence as part of the core
1We borrow this example from Stokke (2017, p. 133).
2
content should still be taken seriously.
2 Core Content and Grice on ‘Therefore’
(2) conveys that Fatima’s cheerfulness is due to her being Australian.2 Whereas
(3) merely conveys that Fatima is both Australian and cheerful.
(2) Fatima is Australian, therefore she is cheerful.
(3) Fatima is Australian and cheerful.
Like (2), most examples of ‘therefore’ constructions discussed in the literature
concern a dependence between tokens, or particulars, like the dependence of
one person’s happiness on her financial security, rather than type-level depen-
dencies, such as the dependence of happiness on financial security in general.
Our focus here is on the token dependence that distinguishes (2) from (3).
An influential view in the literature says that this dependence is not part
of what is literally said. According to this view, the dependence is merely
presupposed or implicated by uttering claims like (2). This view finds a natural
starting point in a passage from Grice (1975, p. 44–45 our italics):
If I say (smugly), “He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave”, I
have certainly committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my
words, to its being the case that his being brave is a consequence
of (follows from) his being an Englishman. But while I have said
that he is an Englishman and said that he is brave, I do not want to
say that I have said (in the favored sense) that it follows from his being an
Englishman that he is brave, though I have certainly indicated, and so
implicated, that this is so. I do not want to say that my utterance
of this sentence would be, STRICTLY SPEAKING, false should the
consequence in question fail to hold.
2Alternatively, it can signal a dependence between the speakers beliefs about Fatima’s cheer-
fulness and her being Australian. For the sake of brevity, we will assume that such an alternative
reading is generally available throughout this text, rather than reminding the reader explicitly for
every example.
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In short, Grice suggests that claims like (2) and (3) are alike with regards to
what is said (in his favoured sense). (2) and (3) only differ with regards to what
they implicate and indicate; what is literally said, in Grice’s favoured sense, by
uttering (2) and (3) is the same. Several authors have taken this suggestion to
heart and provided arguments in its favour.
Before turning to these arguments, we need at least a working conception of
the distinction between what is said and what is merely indicated or implicated.
As the characterisation of this distinction is the topic of a rich discussion, we
will try to avoid needless controversy by introducing the notion of core content
and characterising this notion via negativa. We will distinguish core content
from three types of content that is taken to be merely implicated or indicated.
The resulting notion will suffice to formulate and defend our preferred view
on the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ constructions.
Let us start with content that is conversationally implicated. To use a hack-
neyed example due to Grice (1961, p. 129-30), suppose, when asked for a letter
of recommendation for an applicant to a philosophy Ph.D. program a professor
writes (4) and leaves it at that:
(4) His handwriting is impeccable.
What the professor has literally said is that the student’s handwriting is impec-
cable, and (4) will be true or false depending on whether his handwriting really
is impeccable. But what the professor has implicated is that the student is no
good at philosophy. This kind of implicature is called ‘conversational’ since the
conversational context (a reference letter for a Ph.D. application) determines
what is conveyed over and above what is literally said.
A second kind of implicated content is conventionally implicated content.
This kind of content is taken to be implicated by broad convention, rather than
the specific conversational content. Consider the following example from Potts
(2007, p 667):
(5) Bart managed to pass the test.
In (5), what is said is that Bart passed the test. The use of ‘managed’ convention-
ally implicates that Bart worked hard to pass the test. Many authors maintain
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that the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ constructions is merely conven-
tionally implicated as well (e.g. Grice, 1975; Potts, 2005, 2007; Neta, 2013).3
Indeed, Potts names ‘therefore’ as a popular and (relatively) uncontroversial
example of conventional implicature (Potts, 2007, p. 666–667).
Aside from these two kinds of implicatures, there is content that is presup-
posed rather than being part of what is said. Consider one says:
(6) Akilah stopped going to class.
What you have literally said is that Akilah is not going to class, but you further
trigger the presupposition that she used to go to class. Recently, Pavese (2017,
forthcoming) and Stokke (2017) have argued that the dependence conveyed by
‘therefore’ constructions is presupposed, rather than being part of what is being
said.4
In these examples we distinguished between what is literally said from what
is implicated or presupposed. The core content of a sentence, as we will use the
label, is just the conveyed content that remains once all conversational impli-
catures, conventional implicatures, and triggered presuppositions are stripped
away. In this sense core content is characterised via negativa. We take it that
this notion of core content is akin to several notions familiar from the literature,
such as Grice’s favoured sense of what is said (cf. supra) and Potts’s descriptive
content (2005; 2007). It is not of primary importance that core content fits on
these notions seamlessly. However, it is sufficiently similar to characterise our
view on the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ constructions and contrast it
with the standard view in the literature.
The view that we will defend here can be characterised as follows:
The Core Dependence View: The dependence conveyed by ‘there-
fore’ constructions is part of the core content of those construc-
tions.
3Although Neta (2013, p. 394 and fn. 3) seems to diverge a bit from the others by maintaining
that the dependence is also asserted.
4Some, like Karttunen (2016), deny that conventional implicatures and triggered presupposi-
tions can be cleanly pulled apart. Since our primary aim is to defend an alternative view, the
question of the distinction between conventional implicature and triggered presupositions need
not concern us here.
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By ‘the dependence conveyed by a ‘therefore’ construction’ we mean the central
(typically token-token) dependence conveyed by that construction. This is
important to clarify since often claims like (7) convey both a token dependence
(that our belief that there is fire depends on our seeing smoke) and a type
dependence (typically, smoke is caused by fire).
(7) We saw smoke, therefore there is a fire.
The Core Dependence View says that the dependence conveyed is part of the
core content of ‘therefore’ constructions like (7). The Core Dependence View
allows for type-type dependencies to be merely implicated or presupposed by
‘therefore’ constructions.
The principal rival of The Core Dependence View is, predictably, TheNon-
Core Dependence View.
The Non-Core Dependence View: The dependence5 conveyed by
‘therefore’ constructions is not part of the core content of these
constructions.
As we have seen, The Non-Core Dependence View is widely accepted in the
contemporary literature (e.g. Stokke, 2017; Pavese, 2017; Neta, 2013; Potts, 2005).
According to these views, ’therefore’ does not differ in its contribution to the
core content from ’and’. The non-core dependence views thus entail that (2)
and (3) have the same core content. We argue that the The Core Dependence
View is still a strong contender relative to such views. We will defend The
Core Dependence View against several important objections: one based on
projection data and one based on judgments about falsity and direct negation.
3 Projection
The primary consideration levelled against TheCoreDependenceView is based
on projection data. In this section, we argue that the relevant data can be
reconciled elegantly with The Core Dependence View by adopting the general
projection hypothesis defended by Simons et al. (2010) and Roberts et al. (2009),
5Again the crucial (typically token-token) dependence.
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which ties projection to at issueness. We also point to an apparent difference
between the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ constructions and standard
cases of non-core content when it comes to at issueness. Let us start with a brief
discussion of projection data and what they are supposed to show.
Some linguistic constructions create environments that are entailment can-
celling6 in that the truth of the overall construction does not entail the truth of
the material within it. For example, if I say:
(8) It is not the case that snow is black.
The proposition I express does not entail that snow is black — quite to the
contrary. This is because the ‘it is not the case that’ environment is entailment
cancelling. Aside from negation, standard examples of entailment cancelling
environments include questions, the antecedents of conditionals and modals.
(9) Is snow black?
(10) If snow is black, I will need a different camo suit.
(11) Maybe snow is black.
None of these entail that snow is black.
Non-core content, such as triggered presuppositions and conventional im-
plicatures will often survive such cancellations. Consider the conventional
implicature carried by ‘managed’:7
(12) Bart did not manage to pass the test.
(13) Did Bart manage to pass the test?
(14) If Bart manages to pass the test, he gets a new bike.
(15) Maybe Bart managed to pass the test.
None of these entail that Bart passed the test, but they do convey that he tried
hard. The latter information is thus said to project out of these entailment
cancelling environments.
Similar behaviour is observed with triggered presuppositions. Consider for
example:
6Environments of this kind are also known as nonveridical environments (cf. Zwarts, 1995).
7The following four examples are variations of those given by Potts (2007, p 667). See also
Karttunen and Peters (1979, p. 14) for a detailed analysis of ’managed’ in entailment cancelling
environments.
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(16) Akilah did not stop going to class.
(17) Did Akilah stop going to class?
(18) If Akilah stops going to class, she loses her allowance.
(19) Maybe Akilah stopped going to class.
None of these entail that Akilah stopped going to class, but they do convey that
she used to attend class regularly. Again, the latter information projects out of
these entailment cancelling environments.
We can highlight this projection behaviour by considering the pairs such as:
(20) Akilah didn’t stop going to class. #She never went to class.
(21) Akilah didn’t stop going to class. She showed up every
morning, much against her will.
The second part of (20) seems to be in tension with the first part while there is
no such tension between the parts of (21). This indicates that the information
that Akilah used to attend class regularly is not part of the core content of those
constructions.
Defenders of The Non-Core Dependence View note that the dependence
conveyed by ‘therefore’ can project out entailment cancelling environments as
well. For example, Stokke (2017, p. 138) remarks that the following sentences all
have readings on which the conveyed dependence projects out of the entailment
cancelling environments:
(22) It’s not the case that the supply of oil will decrease and
therefore prices will increase.
(23) If the supply of oil decreases, and therefore oil prices in-
crease, we’ll see more investment in solar power.
(24) Will the supply of oil decrease and therefore oil prices in-
crease?
That is to say, these can be read as conveying that the oil prices depend on oil
supply, whereas they cannot be read as conveying that the supply decreased or
that the prices increased. If we pursue the line of thought underlying TheNon-
CoreDependenceView, a similar reading is available of ‘therefore’ construction
in environments created by modal constructions, such as:
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(25) Maybe the supply of oil decreased and therefore the oil prices
increased.
On such a projective reading, the speaker is not committed to there being either
a decrease of oil supply or an increase of oil prices, but she does commit herself
to there being some dependence between the two. 8
Given that core content typically does not project out of such environments,
shown by (8) – (11), and non-core content typically projects out of such envi-
ronments, as is shown by (12) – (19), the above cases of embedded ‘therefore’
construction can be taken to indicate that the dependence conveyed by these
constructions is not part of their core content. And indeed, Neta (2013), Potts
(2005), Pavese (2017, forthcoming) and Stokke (2017) take this lesson from the
projection data.
Unsurprisingly, we favour a different explanation of therefore’s projection
behaviour. Following the general hypothesis about projection behaviour pro-
posed by Roberts et al. (2009) and Simons et al. (2010), we suggest that the
dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ construction sometimes projects out of
entailment cancelling environments because the dependence can fail to be at
issue. Given that core content can fail to be at issue, our proposed explanation
of the projection data is compatible with The CoreDependence View. This line
of reasoning requires some unpacking.
Let us start with the general projection hypothesis proposed by Roberts
et al. (2009) and Simons et al. (2010):
General Projection Hypothesis All and only the not-at-issue con-
tent of a constituent projects, given an appropriate context of
utterance. (Roberts et al., 2009, p. 6)
This hypothesis ties projection behaviour to at-issueness. Roughly speaking,
content can be said to be ‘at issue’, only when it helps to address the question
under discussion and the question under discussion is the implicit or explicit
question that guides conversation.
8Although Stokke does not rely on the example of modal environments in his 2017 article, he
confirmed that he finds this a plausible reading in personal communication.
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Given that the core content of our words is at least to some extent inde-
pendent of our conversational goals, core content and at-issueness can come
apart (cf. Simons et al., 2010, sect. 7).9 The core content of the same words can
be at issue relative to one conversational context, but non-at-issue relative to
another. To see this, consider the following pair:
(26) Q1: Is your brother in town again?
A1: He rocked up yesterday in a shabby, blue Corvette.
(27) Q2: How did your brother make it all the way here?
A2: He rocked up yesterday in a shabby, blue Corvette.
In (26), ‘he rocked up yesterday’ is at issue, but ‘in a shabby, blue corvette’ is
not, even though they are both part of the core content. In (27), ‘he rocked up
yesterday’ is not at issue, but ‘in a shabby, blue Corvette’ is. Although the core
content is identical for A1 and A2, what is at issue differs.
These examples demonstrate that core content can fail to be at issue.10 If
The General Projection Hypothesis is correct, this opens up the possibility
that the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ construction is part of their core
content, even though this content sometimes projects out of entailment cancel-
ing environments. After all, all not-at-issue content projects out according to
The General Projection Hypothesis
The projection behaviour of ‘therefore’ construction can, in fact, be used to
illustrate the initial plausibility of the The General Projection Hypothesis. If
this hypothesis is correct, we should expect that the dependence conveyed by
therefore does not project out of entailment cancelling environments when the
relevant dependence itself is at issue. This is in fact what we observe.
9This is not to say that core content never interacts with the question under discussion. For
example, Schoubye and Stokke (2016) argue that core content can be enriched by the question
under discussion.
10A note on terminology: ‘at issue content’ or ‘at issueness’ is used in a variety of ways in the
literature. Some of these uses match more closely with our use of ‘core content’ than our use of ‘at
issue content’, and some use ‘core content’ and ‘at issue content’ interchangeably Pavese (e.g. 2017,
p. 89). We follow the use presented in Simons et al. (2010), which allows at issue content and core
content to come apart.
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(28) Q: The recent increase in oil prices are a scandal and evidence
the sheer incompetence of our current administration.
A: What makes you think it’s their fault? Maybe the oil
supply decreased and therefore the prices increased.
Although Q’s utterance seems to presuppose that there is some type-level
regularity between oil prices and oil supply, it does not presuppose that the
current increase in oil prices follows from a decrease in supply. That is to say,
the (token-token) dependence conveyed in this case does not project out of the
entailment cancelling environment created by the modal. Instead, the ‘maybe’
modal targets the (token-token) dependence conveyed by therefore; A portends
that the price increase may be due to a supply decrease.
A similar pattern can be observed for other entailment cancelling environ-
ments. If the dependence is at issue, it tends not to project out. Consider
for instance the following examples, where the dependence is at issue and
subsequently does not project:
(29) Sure, Bill gave up drinking, but is he therefore a better per-
son?
(30) If Geoffrey is getting too little sunlight and is therefore get-
ting depressed, he should really consider a holiday in Ar-
gentina.
(31) Q: Do you think Geoffrey’s cheerfulness is due to low expo-
sure to sunlight?
A: Sure, he has not seen the sun in weeks and he has been
awfully cheerful. But it is not that he has been living in the
dark and he is therefore cheerful. Frankly, I think he is in
love.
(29) questions whether it follows from Bill’s quitting that he is a better person,
in (30) the truth of the consequent is conditional on Geoffrey’s depression
being due to a low exposure to sunlight, and in (31), A denies that Geoffrey’s
cheerfulness is due to his living in the dark.
Together with (22) – (25), (28) – (31) corroborate the General Projection
Hypothesis. In (22) – (25) it is unclear whether the dependence is at issue and
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projective readings are available. In (28) – (31) the dependence appears to be at
issue and a non-projective reading suggests itself. This indicates that projection
behaviour is tied to at-issueness rather than the core content/non-core content
distinction. If this is true, these projection data on their own do not yield a
reason to reject The Core Dependence View.
Perhaps the opponents of The Core Dependence View can still build a case
on projection behaviour by taking into account a broader array of data. Even
if projection is primarily tied to at-issueness, it might still be the case that the
conveyed dependence mirrors the projection behaviour of non-core content in
a broad variety of cases. One might take this as evidence that the dependence
conveyed by ‘therefore’ construction is not part of the core content of these
constructions.
It is up to the opponents of The Core Dependence View to produce such
data, but we should note a preliminary difficulty for this strategy. In general,
non-core content such as conventional implicatures and triggered presupposi-
tion are difficult to make at issue, and attempts to do so often result in infelicity
(cf. Simons et al., 2010, p. 322).11 As we have seen, the dependence conveyed
by ‘therefore’ constructions can be at issue in certain contexts, and in those
contexts this dependence does not project out of entailment cancelling environ-
ments. This effect is hard to imitate with standard cases of non-core content.
Attempts to answer the question under discussion with non-core content of
clauses in entailment cancelling environments often result in infelicity rather
than stopping the projection behaviour:
(32) Q1: Did Carmen have any unhealthy habits?
A1: # Maybe she stopped smoking.
(33) Q2: Did Bart work hard for the test?
A2: # Maybe he managed to pass the test.
The use of ‘stopped’ in A1 conveys that Carmen used to smoke and this con-
veyed information directly answers Q1. Even so, this seemingly at-issue in-
formation projects out of the entailment cancelling environment created by
11We set aside conversational implicatures here, as none of the defenders of The Non-Core
Dependence View hold that the dependence is conveyed by conversational implicature.
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‘maybe’ and the overall utterance is infelicitous. In (33), the conventional im-
plicature that Bart worked hard for the test directly answers Q2. Here too, this
content still projects out of the modal environment and the overall utterance is
infelicitous. Unlike the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ constructions, the
non-core content in these cases cannot simply be stopped from projecting out by
making it at issue. Instead, attempts to answer the question under discussion
with these standard examples of non-core content often result in infelicity.12
One might worry that this spells trouble for The General Projection Hy-
pothesis. (32) and (33) appear to be cases in which at-issue content fails to
project. However, the projection hypothesis makes no claims about what kind
of content can be at issue. In particular, The General Projection Hypothe-
sis leaves it open that non-core content such as triggered presuppositions and
conventional implicatures is earmarked for non-at-issueness and is therefore
difficult to render at issue felicitously. We refer to Simons et al. (2010, p. 319–322)
for a more elaborate discussion of this point. For our purposes, the takeaway
is that, rather than bearing out a similarity between the dependence conveyed
by therefore and non-core content in standard cases, the interaction between
at-issueness and projection appears to reveal a contrast between the depen-
dence content conveyed by ‘therefore’ constructions and familiar instances of
non-core content: the conveyed information about dependence can easily be
used to address the question under discussion felicitously, whereas familiar
kinds of non-core content are resistant to such use.
In summary, the projection data presented in support of The Non-Core
Dependence View does not establish the falsity of The Core Dependence View
and the interaction between at-issueness and standard non-core content in fact
supports The Core Dependence View. All in all, the projection behaviour of
therefore appears to be compatible with The Core Dependence View.
12Admittedly, this is not always the case; see Abbott (2006, p. 11) for examples. Proponents of The
Non-Core Dependence View might argue that non-projective readings of ‘therefore’ fit with such
known cases of non-projecting non-core content. We leave a further exploration of such a strategy
to those proponents. Again, our primary aim here is to demonstrate that The Core Dependence
View fits the data, and we do not pretend to establish that its competitors do not fit the data.
13
4 Falsity and Direct Negation
Another popular reason to reject The Core Dependence View is judgements
about falsity and direct negation. Opponents of The Core Dependence View
often maintain that claims involving ‘therefore’ cannot be false merely in virtue
of the conveyed dependence not holding.
For example, Stokke (2017, p. 133) maintains that it is not clear that one is
lying if one utters (1), when both the switch in the hall and the lights in the
office are on, but one knows full well that these two facts are not related:
(1) The switch in the hall is on, and therefore the lights in the
office are on.
He goes on to compare this case with standard cases of presupposition failure,
such as uttering (34) when one knows full well that Jim has never been drinking
(Stokke, 2017, p. 142):
(34) Jim has stopped drinking.
According to Stokke, (1) and (34) are not false in these contexts.13 They are
merely deceptive.14
In a similar vein, Pavese (2017, p. 88–89) calls claims like (1) ‘weird-sounding’
rather than false and maintains that they are not the proper target of direct nega-
tion. For example, she judges the following sequence to be infelicitous, because
B attempts to directly deny the dependence conveyed by A’s utterance (Pavese,
2017, p. 89):
(35) A: Mark is an Englishman, and he is, therefore, brave.
B: # That is false.
These intuitions about falsity and direct negation pose a challenge for The
CoreDependenceView. Typically, utterances with false core content are judged
to be false simpliciter and are the proper target of direct negation. Consider:
(36) A: Snow is black.
B: That is false.
13See also Grice (1975, p. 45), who maintains such cases are not ‘strictly false’ (cf. supra).
14See Viebahn (forthcoming) for an argument to the extent that one can lie with presuppositions.
14
There is no doubt that A says something false (rather than just ‘weird-sounding’)
and that B’s direct denial is felicitous.
We agree that these intuitions are an important explanandum and we will
argue that they can be explained without giving up on The Core Dependence
View. Before doing so however, we should note that many others have reported
the opposite intuition. McCawley (1993), Bach (1999, p. 330), Neale (1999) and
Horn (2013) all report that the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ can be
properly targeted for direct negation.15 In line with these judgments, we judge
that utterances of (37) are false, rather than merely weird-sounding or deceptive,
and are typically the proper target of direct negation
(37) 12 is a number, therefore 12 is even.
We report similar intuitions about cases like (1) and (35) in contexts where the
relevant dependence fails to hold. To our ears, there is nothing wrong with
targeting the dependence conveyed by therefore with a direct negation.16
Moreover, we take direct negation to point towards another difference be-
tween the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ constructions and standard
cases of non-core content. By directly denying or affirming a statement, one is
typically taken to acquiesce in the non-core content carried by that statement.
For example, when responding to questions like
(38) Did Bart manage to pass the test?
(39) Has Akilah stopped going to class?
One cannot respond with either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ without acquiescing in the presup-
position that Bart worked hard or that Akilah used to attend class. One has to
step back to target the relevant non-core content. For instance you could reply
‘wait a minute, she never attended class!’ or ‘what do you mean? She never
attended class!’.
15Remarkably, neither Pavese (2017, Forthcoming) nor Stokke (2017) engage with this work and
only present the Non-Core Dependence intuition as the relevant data concerning direct negation.
16Admittedly, direct negation will be awkward when the reported dependence is a doxastic
one (i.e. a dependence between beliefs), but this is plausibly due to a general awkwardness
about directly negating self-directed statements about doxastic attitudes. Consider the following
interaction: “A: I believe the lights in the office are on. B: # No you don’t.”
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But by answering ‘no’ to (40) one does not thereby acquiesce in the claim
that Fatima’s cheerfulness depends on her being Australian, or at least such is
our intuitive judgment.
(40) Fatima is Australian. Is she therefore cheerful?
It seems to us that one can simply reply ‘no’ without either denying that she is
Australian or denying that she is cheerful. If it is true that the dependence is
often the appropriate target of direct negation, then TheCoreDependenceView
can neatly explain why that is; it is the appropriate target of direct negation
because it is part of the core content of the sentence.
A natural response from the Non-CoreDependence camp is to maintain that
these direct negations are metalinguistic negations. That is to say, they may target
the appropriateness of the use of the word ‘therefore’ instead of ‘and’ or ‘also’,
without targeting the core content of the utterance. Such metalinguistic uses of
direct negation are familiar from cases like (41), where the appropriateness of
‘manage’ is disputed because it carries the presupposition that John invested
serious effort (Horn, 1985, p. 130):
(41) John didn’t MANAGE to solve some problems. He was
given the answers.
Pavese (forthcoming, p. 14, fn 11) remarks that direct metalinguistic negation
of the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ constructions is compatible with
that dependence being a triggered presupposition. On such a view, the ‘no’ in
response to faulty ‘therefore’ claims like (40) is of a kind with the ‘didn’t’ in
(41): it targets the word-choice rather than the truth value.
The exploration of this line on behalf of the Non-Core Dependence View
will have to be left for future work. Again, our primary concern is not whether
Non-CoreDependenceViews can be made to fit the data. However, we should
note that the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ can be directly negated in
a variety of ways. For example, Horn (2013, p. 180), referencing Ward (2003),
remarks that the exclamation ‘Bullshit!’ can target the conveyed dependence,
but typically cannot target non-core content like the tension conveyed by ‘but’:17
17These data are all the more pressing for Pavese (2017, forthcoming) and Stokke (2017), as they
present the tension elicited by ‘but’ as a running example for a triggered presupposition.
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(42) A: “Her name is Caroline. She’s an Italian girl but she’s
pretty.”
B: # “Bullshit, Ma.” Frank said. “Why not ‘and she’s
pretty’?”
(43) A: Lance loves musical comedies and has seen “Mamma
Mia” twice.
He is, therefore, gay.
B: Bullshit. That doesn’t follow.
Although Horn admits that the intuitions are not always clear-cut, calling
bullshit typically targets the truth value, rather than the choice of words or non-
core content.18 Examples like (43) thus suggest that the dependence conveyed
by therefore can be targeted for direct, descriptive negation.
It can thus appear that we are stuck in an intuition deadlock. Some report
intuitions that lend support to The Non-Core Dependence View, and others
report opposite intuitions that directly support The Core Dependence View.
Rather than merely locking horns on intuitions, we propose to explain this di-
vergence in intuitions by again relying on TheGeneralProjectionHypothesis.
As we’ve seen, The General Projection Hypothesis predicts that the con-
veyed dependence in ‘therefore’ constructions is projective if and only if it is
not at issue. As noted by Roberts et al. (2009), projective content is typically not
the proper target of direct negation. If this is true, it should come as no surprise
that intuitions about ‘therefore’ constructions diverge when presented without
further context to provide clues as to which question is under discussion. Some
readers are likely to be more inclined than others to fill in the contextual details
such that the relevant dependence is at issue, and how one is inclined to fill in
these contextual details will affect one’s judgements about these cases. We can
give this tentative explanation a test run by considering ‘therefore’ claims in
different contexts again. For a direct negation-friendly case, recall (28):
(28) Q: The recent increase in oil prices are a scandal and evidence
the sheer incompetence of our current administration.
18See Horn (2014, p. 125–126) and Horn (2018, p. 30–31) for more on the Bullshit test.
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A: What makes you think it’s their fault? Maybe the oil
supply decreased and therefore the prices increased.
For a contrast, consider:
(44) Q: Do you think Mark will hold his own?
A: Don’t worry. Mark is an Englishman, and he is, therefore,
brave.
Although our Core Dependence View intuitions linger, we can see how A
would be a less clear example of a lie in (44) than in (28) — assuming of course,
that in both cases the speaker knows full well that the dependence does not
hold. In (44), Mark’s bravery is at issue, but the reasons for his bravery are not.
Consequently, a direct negation is intuitively read as targeting this bravery. In
(28) by contrast, the origin of the oil price increase is what is at issue and a direct
negation is intuitively interpreted as targeting the conveyed dependence.19
The question of falsity and direct negation gives rise to conflicting judge-
ments about ‘therefore’ claims. Consequently, these do not univocally favour
or disfavour The Core Dependence View. However, we can explain this di-
vergence by pointing to different possible ways of filling in the question under
discussion. There is potential for further research here. Surveys could be used
to map judgements about these cases. Perhaps the question under discus-
sion indeed tracks the acceptability of direct negation, or perhaps they tend
to favour (Non-)Core Dependence intuitions across the board. For now, we
conclude that the diverging judgements reported in the literature can be cap-
tured by TheCoreDependenceViewwith the help of TheGeneral Projection
Hypothesis.
5 Context Sensitivity
Pavese (2017, p. 90) claims that understanding the dependence conveyed by
‘therefore’ constructions as being conveyed via a presupposition trigger helps
19Though his proposal does not rely on TheGeneral ProjectionHypothesis, Neale (1999, p. 57–
60) provides a similar explanation of the conflicting intuitions in direct negation cases. Horn (2013,
p. 155–156) also suggests such a view of appositives and non-restrictive relative clauses.
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to “ [. . . ] predict and to account for the remarkable context-sensitivity of
‘therefore’-sentences”. This consideration might give us reason to prefer the
presupposition-based conception of how the dependence is conveyed by ‘there-
fore’ constructions over a Potts-style conventional implicature view as Pavese
suggests. However, it does not give us reason to prefer the presupposition-
based view over The Core Dependence View.
This is because context sensitivity at the level of core content is extremely
common. For instance, contextualist treatments of knowledge (Lewis, 1996),
counterfactuals (Lewis, 1973; Lewis, 2016; Sandgren and Steele, 2020), absolute
gradable adjectives (Kennedy, 2007), and causation (Hitchcock, 1996; Menzies,
2004) are common, powerful, and attractive. It is very plausible that the core
content of ‘therefore’ constructions is context sensitive in the same way. After
all, ‘therefore’ constructions (much like ‘because’ constructions) are often tied
to explanation (especially when they are answers to ‘why’ questions) which is
plausibly context sensitive (for an excellent discussion of this point, see Jenkins
(2008)).
While attempting to highlight the ability of her view, according to which
the dependence conveyed in ‘therefore’ constructions is presupposed, Pavese
(2017, p. 90) uses an example in which we are conducting an experiment on a
group of people all of whom are either progressive or not from the north, and
we know this. We also know Mark is part of that group. In this case, (45) is
both true and felicitous.
(45) Mark is a progressive and he is, therefore, from the North.
However, this is no reason to prefer Pavese’s view over the Core Dependence
View since the latter predicts that (45) is true and felicitous in this context as
well. In particular, there is an explanatory dependence that (45) conveys and
in this context that dependence holds. While, generally speaking, being from
the North does not depend on being progressive, this dependence does hold
for the specific set of people that we, in the local conversational context, know
Mark to be selected from. This knowledge, together with the knowledge that
Mark is a progressive, justifies the inference that he is from the North.
We contend that there is no reason to suppose that the core content of
19
‘therefore’ constructions is not context sensitive. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to develop a more fully worked out contextualist account of therefore,
but context-sensitivity does not provide a strong reason to reject The Core
Dependence View.20
6 Conclusion
We have defended a view on the dependence conveyed by ‘therefore’ con-
structions; the view that this dependence is part of the core content of such
constructions. The central piece of evidence presented against this view is that
the dependence sometimes projects out of entailment cancelling environments.
We argued that the projection data involving ‘therefore’ constructions in fact
suggest a more complicated picture of the relationship between projection and
core-content: the dependence projects out of such environments just when it
is not at-issue. Crucially, this allows that the projective content is sometimes
part of the core content. Further evidence levied against TheCoreDependence
View can be accommodated as well. The diverging intuitions concerning falsity
and direct negation can be explained by relying on at-issueness, and context-
sensitivity does not typically distinguish between core content and non-core
content. All in all, we have argued that The Core Dependence View is at least
as plausible as its principal rivals and has been underappreciated in the recent
literature.
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